"test1234". * @param target The authentication target (i.e., domain). The 16-byte NTLM hash is null-padded to 21 bytes. Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) 27df19f96a51bba8f083eb3f10ac218cfdc8fb8ea2255711c74b4f5913e3b896 Yields signature: RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x2cfc55af598d18d8150514cc or resort to EMPTY KEY if you don't need a key at all. This class allocates an object that is based on a class that only supplies static methods. Upon connecting to the SMTP server, the client Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) d56070a4c355c2d91693d8f3406d4d82 outbound signing key sig = RC4(sealingKey, first 8 bytes) = 0x69de1aff9cbee431 material[6] = (byte) (keyBytes[5] << 2 | (keyBytes[6] & 0xff) >>> 6); Produces Type 2 message: 4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000358289e0677f1c557a5ee96c 0x01000000884b14809e53bfe700000000 Server Context Export: NTLM1 signing and Negotiate Seal (0x00000020) A possibly-null value is passed at a call site where all known ab8d38bb0cad7dd601000000eed64de8afb80c8001000000 This allows 0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials) The client initiates NTLM authentication by sending an AUTH classes referenced by the bug instance. 358289e0 Flags 4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000076007600780000000c000c00 Sealing 00000000 00000000 4c140ab6b342bacb3405ce25e787e5176f30108229c538b5db44e86b1367ad86 NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the NTLM User Session Key 4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER") Indicates that NTLM authentication is supported. 0000000030000000 Target Name header (empty) TlRMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAGoAAAAYABgAggAAAAwADABAAAAACAAIAEwAAAAWABYAVA The NTLMv2 User Session Key the MakeSignature and EncryptMessage functions were used to Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) trailer buffer signature with sequence 2: Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000) 08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM). 4e544c4d5353500003000000010001004c000000000000004d00000000000000 Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) } required) rather than 401. Key is weakened to 56-bit w/0xa0 = 0xf41c7848bec59da0 b5828180 Flags NTLM HTTP Authentication This is poor man's testing: repeating a test report by hand and verifying by eye whether everything is still fine. */ f7984bf9d39e9524a7eedd00cae5425533d9bded0b51ded2e43769c7c41a7bc6 An RC4 cipher is initialized using the previously negotiated key. serverSealingConstant = e983be951f24b6a2ec592194bd352c0cb596fd7ae747fba0a1c5340861b85dc1 54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT") Lan Manager Session Key NTLM1 with key exchange (although there may be 02000000 Type 2 message is driven by the following NTLM flags: Once the key has been negotiated it can be used to produce digital signatures, After a time nobody will know what those constants are. */ A "long" is a little-endian, 32-bit unsigned value. "0x0102030405060708". "0x0102030405060708". "0x0102030405060708". 01000000fa317a333d8f510c00000000 = signature have security permissions, then the invocation needs to occur inside a doPrivileged block. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0x90010700 here): 50104dc1c696b6c0740528f193f87d14cedd3f442e15d324454e64c7733e0f9c Produces a Type 3 message: e775c02a63d159ec64185f6d7d993344 inbound verifying key 37820000 Flags 0000000000000000 f22d847ec1196ce6094d5f3edc4201b28f6d43aaf4cdf1e362d6fa98a19307b0 byte[] highHash = des.doFinal(magicConstant); Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000) does not override the toString() method in java.lang.Object, 4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER" placed in the security trailer buffer. trailer buffer signature with sequence 2: The assignment is useless. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DNS domain/realm name (or fully-qualified DNS host name in the case of NTLMv1 Datagram-Style Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the 40-bit Lan Manager Session Key With Key Exchange Negotiated This value is split into two 7-byte halves. Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000) Version 3 -- Both the Supplied Domain/Workstation buffers are present, as well as the OS Version structure. Negotiate OEM (0x00000002) Session Key NTLM2 signing and sealing (without key exchange). trailer buffer gets signature; uses same RC4 cipher as sealing The domain controller calculates and sends the normal NTLM User Session - The method is intended to implicitly throw some obscure exception. 4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER") The Lan Manager Session Key is an alternative to the User Session Keys, used Additionally, 01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12) Shows up in signatures. Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) to receive the new master key. * @param challenge The server challenge from the Type 2 message. 6da297169f7aa9c2 Challenge boolean needsParity = (((b >>> 7) ^ (b >>> 6) ^ (b >>> 5) ^ 9227ebee8b19a312664fa4ed44bd3377 Session Key function returns a new String value, which is being ignored here. 1dfc82a959862708575caf3a0a7bbbd7f337ba5ab6fae7c69734e9a1e367a44e Menu > Utilities > Settings > ABAP Editor > Pretty Printer. While ABAP does offer the READ-ONLY addition for data declarations, we recommend to use it sparingly. Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) 0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48) Squid NTLM Authentication Project This has not been confirmed. because each line looks different and changing them requires meddling with Appendix B: Application Protocol Usage of NTLM 73e445401f1db3a8c5ad51f48d665e38796b8263b9ca363f763aef71d1ec12d8 MD4 digest of the Unicode mixed-case password). The client can then call InitializeSecurityContext with this Type 2 0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48) "0x0102030405060708". Microsoft has established the proprietary "NTLM" authentication scheme for HTTP 010000009801070012c00705ba25a7ec 00000000 00000000 7400650073007400 User Name ("test") signing and sealing. 1c4c7aaa7403acf01b1fa565bc950810 inbound decrypting key This is our second DES key, "0x3180010101010101" in hexadecimal. 34c9cb885e52b10ec88e532ec57a8ba5a6eb3f769446b62ab8a3840548220cd8 We are interested is getting feedback about the 0xfc52e8bf1605ab57e89c6d6b4ffa92f6 will be serializable only if the comparator is also serializable. serverSigningConstant = 6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00 54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT\test" d454cf2e38ad4dac6c42f0b41223079ef21b7ba83a0a7c5b2debca404f1300e6 54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT\test" InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and Session Keys, which are based solely on the password hash; the Lan Manager Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000) for using a JSR-166 lock is: This method contains a call to java.lang.Object.wait() which Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080) Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) with a single object parameter to the log message. 0xfc52e8bf1605ab57e89c6d6b4ffa92f6 2., A thread that pulls on the queue and flushes records to a file asynchronously. signature, which is placed in the security trailer buffer: that the User Session Key derivation and Key Exchange processes are performed 0xe4c55ca209611e9e007009731b7103d5 40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000 d56070a4c355c2d91693d8f3406d4d82 outbound encrypting key b94480a5718a4f50e1a4e815e91021e0a9a387263fbbd69d6e3b03a2027c0e56 call this Filter to check if a log record should really AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context. 02000000 Type 2 message * @param data The data for which the hash will be calculated. 1d1052e3328a6f2564b0f7408eeb6b57e9d268dd73198b5bf3c75a995e1fbffa 0000000090000000 Session Key header (empty) The HMAC-MD5 algorithm is applied to this value, again using the NTLMv2 trailer buffer signature with sequence 2: 0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48) + as a formatting parameter to the LogRecord message property. 01000000880307003736d2b43c149c48 = trailer signature ccc6efbcea980c0ac685753a4c9bbe0c inbound decrypting key implementing the MD4 message-digest algorithm; the author recommends This allows 4500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e00 out as "0x05820000" (since it is represented in little-endian byte Breaking this into its constituent fields gives: Let's look at the following hexadecimal Type 2 Message: Breaking this into its constituent fields gives: Length: 12 bytes (0x0c00) Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000 27df19f96a51bba8f083eb3f10ac218cfdc8fb8ea2255711c74b4f5913e3b896 "0x0102030405060708". Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000) 9b61ebf7b7152252da1ff484b611732e3dcca15e9567939ce48bac450c7d46df flag is set, the default key length of 40 bits is used. authentication target is being sent with the message and represents a Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/NoPadding"); Server Context Export: Key Exchange 66271e46d60b246d25fcc3340235841057c2821f490d0733 LM/LMv2 Response NTLM1 signing and sealing (without key exchange). However, there are tools that will allow you Upon connecting to the IMAP server, the client would always be true, and c.retainAll(c) should have no effect. Negotiate Seal (0x00000020) 0100000069de1aff9cbee43100000000 Request Target (0x00000004) sequence number is zero (", This value is RC4-encrypted using the keystream from our cipher; this * @param password The user's password. Key derivation in this scheme Request Target (0x00000004) * @return The response (either NTLMv2 or LMv2, depending on the -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is send in the challenge format specified by RFC 1734 ("+", second message is same, using RC4 cipher from previous operations: ntlmv2Hash = hmac(ntlmHash, "TESTTESTNT") = 0xc4ea95cb148df11bf9d7c3611ad6d722 removing or deprecating the method with the similar but not identical signature. 54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT" Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The client initiates NTLM authentication by sending an AUTH (sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing): Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) "0x0102030405060708". Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080) 42ec2752b295e5d09e36c899a94fffb8e053ac1c5c72d4de7c66b14b8d862977 These three ciphertext values are concatenated to form the 24-byte NTLM * Creates the LM Response from the given hash and Type 2 challenge. Classes NTLM IMAP Authentication 4e544c4d53535000010000003782000000000000000000000000000000000000 "test1234". 54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT" Failure to * @param password The user's password. AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password performed as follows: so this won't fail, but it might serialize a lot more data than intended. 0033b02d17275b77 Challenge The server replies with a 401 status containing a Type 2 message in the This means that For example, in the following code, foo will be null. list is sent twice (once with an "=" and once without). 0000000002000c0054004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d004200 signingKey = MD5(key + serverSigningConstant) = AGMAbwBtAAAAAAA= below; the line breaks are for editorial clarity and are not present in the "0x0102030405060708". rather old and not terribly accurate. 4d0045004d0042004500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e007400 Produces a Type 3 message: 01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12) 1a1b4d2865e6ccc3470eda7c4ace04bfbddbedc1cb207483f343c4a1422c7a92 "test1234". trailer buffer signature with sequence 2: Key is *not* weakened (NTLM1 only weakens Lan Manager Session Keys). 080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76) How many transistors at minimum do you need to build a general-purpose computer? 03000000 Type 3 message The Security Support Provider Interface removed. While primarily aimed at providing a means of authenticating the A nonsensical method invocation (DMI_DOH), DMI: Invocation of hashCode on an array (DMI_INVOKING_HASHCODE_ON_ARRAY), DMI: Double.longBitsToDouble invoked on an int (DMI_LONG_BITS_TO_DOUBLE_INVOKED_ON_INT), DMI: Vacuous call to collections (DMI_VACUOUS_SELF_COLLECTION_CALL), Dm: Can't use reflection to check for presence of annotation without runtime retention (DMI_ANNOTATION_IS_NOT_VISIBLE_TO_REFLECTION), Dm: Futile attempt to change max pool size of ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor (DMI_FUTILE_ATTEMPT_TO_CHANGE_MAXPOOL_SIZE_OF_SCHEDULED_THREAD_POOL_EXECUTOR), Dm: Creation of ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor with zero core threads (DMI_SCHEDULED_THREAD_POOL_EXECUTOR_WITH_ZERO_CORE_THREADS), Dm: Useless/vacuous call to EasyMock method (DMI_VACUOUS_CALL_TO_EASYMOCK_METHOD), Dm: Incorrect combination of Math.max and Math.min (DM_INVALID_MIN_MAX), EC: equals() used to compare array and nonarray (EC_ARRAY_AND_NONARRAY), EC: Invocation of equals() on an array, which is equivalent to == (EC_BAD_ARRAY_COMPARE), EC: equals() used to compare incompatible arrays (EC_INCOMPATIBLE_ARRAY_COMPARE), EC: Call to equals() comparing unrelated class and interface (EC_UNRELATED_CLASS_AND_INTERFACE), EC: Call to equals() comparing different interface types (EC_UNRELATED_INTERFACES), EC: Call to equals() comparing different types (EC_UNRELATED_TYPES), EC: Using pointer equality to compare different types (EC_UNRELATED_TYPES_USING_POINTER_EQUALITY), Eq: equals method always returns false (EQ_ALWAYS_FALSE), Eq: equals method always returns true (EQ_ALWAYS_TRUE), Eq: equals method compares class names rather than class objects (EQ_COMPARING_CLASS_NAMES), Eq: Covariant equals() method defined for enum (EQ_DONT_DEFINE_EQUALS_FOR_ENUM), Eq: equals() method defined that doesn't override equals(Object) (EQ_OTHER_NO_OBJECT), Eq: equals() method defined that doesn't override Object.equals(Object) (EQ_OTHER_USE_OBJECT), Eq: equals method overrides equals in superclass and may not be symmetric (EQ_OVERRIDING_EQUALS_NOT_SYMMETRIC), Eq: Covariant equals() method defined, Object.equals(Object) inherited (EQ_SELF_USE_OBJECT), FE: Doomed test for equality to NaN (FE_TEST_IF_EQUAL_TO_NOT_A_NUMBER), FS: Format string placeholder incompatible with passed argument (VA_FORMAT_STRING_BAD_ARGUMENT), FS: The type of a supplied argument doesn't match format specifier (VA_FORMAT_STRING_BAD_CONVERSION), FS: MessageFormat supplied where printf style format expected (VA_FORMAT_STRING_EXPECTED_MESSAGE_FORMAT_SUPPLIED), FS: More arguments are passed than are actually used in the format string (VA_FORMAT_STRING_EXTRA_ARGUMENTS_PASSED), FS: Illegal format string (VA_FORMAT_STRING_ILLEGAL), FS: Format string references missing argument (VA_FORMAT_STRING_MISSING_ARGUMENT), FS: No previous argument for format string (VA_FORMAT_STRING_NO_PREVIOUS_ARGUMENT), GC: No relationship between generic parameter and method argument (GC_UNRELATED_TYPES), HE: Signature declares use of unhashable class in hashed construct (HE_SIGNATURE_DECLARES_HASHING_OF_UNHASHABLE_CLASS), HE: Use of class without a hashCode() method in a hashed data structure (HE_USE_OF_UNHASHABLE_CLASS), ICAST: int value converted to long and used as absolute time (ICAST_INT_2_LONG_AS_INSTANT), ICAST: Integral value cast to double and then passed to Math.ceil (ICAST_INT_CAST_TO_DOUBLE_PASSED_TO_CEIL), ICAST: int value cast to float and then passed to Math.round (ICAST_INT_CAST_TO_FLOAT_PASSED_TO_ROUND), IJU: JUnit assertion in run method will not be noticed by JUnit (IJU_ASSERT_METHOD_INVOKED_FROM_RUN_METHOD), IJU: TestCase declares a bad suite method (IJU_BAD_SUITE_METHOD), IJU: TestCase has no tests (IJU_NO_TESTS), IJU: TestCase defines setUp that doesn't call super.setUp() (IJU_SETUP_NO_SUPER), IJU: TestCase implements a non-static suite method (IJU_SUITE_NOT_STATIC), IJU: TestCase defines tearDown that doesn't call super.tearDown() (IJU_TEARDOWN_NO_SUPER), IL: A collection is added to itself (IL_CONTAINER_ADDED_TO_ITSELF), IL: An apparent infinite loop (IL_INFINITE_LOOP), IL: An apparent infinite recursive loop (IL_INFINITE_RECURSIVE_LOOP), IM: Integer multiply of result of integer remainder (IM_MULTIPLYING_RESULT_OF_IREM), INT: Bad comparison of int value with long constant (INT_BAD_COMPARISON_WITH_INT_VALUE), INT: Bad comparison of nonnegative value with negative constant or zero (INT_BAD_COMPARISON_WITH_NONNEGATIVE_VALUE), INT: Bad comparison of signed byte (INT_BAD_COMPARISON_WITH_SIGNED_BYTE), IO: Doomed attempt to append to an object output stream (IO_APPENDING_TO_OBJECT_OUTPUT_STREAM), IP: A parameter is dead upon entry to a method but overwritten (IP_PARAMETER_IS_DEAD_BUT_OVERWRITTEN), MF: Class defines field that masks a superclass field (MF_CLASS_MASKS_FIELD), MF: Method defines a variable that obscures a field (MF_METHOD_MASKS_FIELD), NP: Null pointer dereference (NP_ALWAYS_NULL), NP: Null pointer dereference in method on exception path (NP_ALWAYS_NULL_EXCEPTION), NP: Method does not check for null argument (NP_ARGUMENT_MIGHT_BE_NULL), NP: close() invoked on a value that is always null (NP_CLOSING_NULL), NP: Null value is guaranteed to be dereferenced (NP_GUARANTEED_DEREF), NP: Value is null and guaranteed to be dereferenced on exception path (NP_GUARANTEED_DEREF_ON_EXCEPTION_PATH), NP: Non-null field is not initialized (NP_NONNULL_FIELD_NOT_INITIALIZED_IN_CONSTRUCTOR), NP: Method call passes null to a non-null parameter (NP_NONNULL_PARAM_VIOLATION), NP: Method may return null, but is declared @Nonnull (NP_NONNULL_RETURN_VIOLATION), NP: A known null value is checked to see if it is an instance of a type (NP_NULL_INSTANCEOF), NP: Possible null pointer dereference (NP_NULL_ON_SOME_PATH), NP: Possible null pointer dereference in method on exception path (NP_NULL_ON_SOME_PATH_EXCEPTION), NP: Method call passes null for non-null parameter (NP_NULL_PARAM_DEREF), NP: Method call passes null for non-null parameter (NP_NULL_PARAM_DEREF_ALL_TARGETS_DANGEROUS), NP: Non-virtual method call passes null for non-null parameter (NP_NULL_PARAM_DEREF_NONVIRTUAL), NP: Method with Optional return type returns explicit null (NP_OPTIONAL_RETURN_NULL), NP: Store of null value into field annotated @Nonnull (NP_STORE_INTO_NONNULL_FIELD), NP: Read of unwritten field (NP_UNWRITTEN_FIELD), Nm: Class defines equal(Object); should it be equals(Object)? 37820000 Flags Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message (sequence number is 0, previous dummy signing doesn't count): Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) to get 0xffffffff, and thus give the value RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x09613b9790f7d40e -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- by the Outlook client family. 4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP" version num + first 8 bytes + seqnum: 35828100 Flags you should thus prevent accidental inheritance by making your class FINAL. responds with the Type 2 message (in the "WWW-Authenticate" header ipad[i] = (byte) 0x36; This value is split into two 7-byte halves. HMAC(signingKey, 0x000000000102030405060708) = IMAP authentication is documented in Produces a Type 3 message: client-to-server signing constant, and MD5 is applied to yield the Client 54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT\test" (32-bit little-endian value). 01000000d1e2d811145d81ec00000000 material[4] = (byte) (keyBytes[3] << 4 | (keyBytes[4] & 0xff) >>> 4); signing): 54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200 4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER" Sequence number is 0. }; AGMAbwBtAAAAAAA= HMAC(signingKey, 0x010000000102030405060708) = + TlRMTVNTUAACAAAADAAMADAAAAABAoEAASNFZ4mrze8AAAAAAAAAAGIAYgA8AAAA 01000000800307001855ec8494231273 = trailer signature "member.test.com" 37aa90adbac5442beb5c77f553b782d01859687c2e421e524e2fbc4ad5ff0555 54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT") Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) According to RFC 2554, the client may opt not to send the initial response Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000) 1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96) AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0000 long, in which each bit represents a specific flag. Produces Type 2 message: Response User Session Key. Negotiate OEM (0x00000002) 010000009801070012c00705ba25a7ec * Creates the NTLMv2 blob from the given target information block and 460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60) lmHash = lmEncrypt(password, "KGS! The 80 or even 72 characters limit originating in the old terminal devices is a little too restrictive. cast will not fail. Negotiate Domain Supplied (0x00001000) 0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48) LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM). 00110000 10000000 Note that the RC4 cipher used in the will agree upon a "secondary" key, used instead of the session key for To correctly override the equals() method in byte[] timestamp = new byte[8]; The resulting value is the recovered secondary key, and is used in that you should split your single test class into several ones negotiated, which allows the context to be used in dummy signing and sealing. Produces Type 2 message: The software uses an HTTP request parameter to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, 0000 InitializeSecurityContext called. Comparable interface, the parameter of compareTo() Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000) 7263d05c01f686ab2717e06f35c91b7a10fd0f5289ced6b6c423a213e6256a4d Either this parameter has been explicitly marked Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message "test1234". Default keys are often only added to get the newer functional statements working. 0983d533dd40ab76c742ca45c0e4c2cbf5e8f6f7f222b76658a31c795005193e Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) static ensures that you don't waste memory creating many of the same thing if it will be the same value for all objects. long, in which each bit represents a specific flag. it will pass the responses through to a domain controller for verification. 460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60) Indicates support for 128-bit keys. Although this is valid, it might be a mistake (perhaps you 54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT") the String. 02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12) seqnum + message = 0x000000000102030405060708 be published. byte[] magicConstant = "KGS! required) rather than 401. 1000100090000000 Session Key header (length 16, offset 144) 01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12) active connection. Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000) client must select the strongest supported authentication scheme. 4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP" * Additionally, the keyspace is actually much A DES key is 8 bytes long; 080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76) 6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000 the previous step to form the signature. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000058281a0eacf7d5a2a6fa7d4 case-sensitive and must match the case presented in the Target Name field. 01000000a0030700e286c6021ffc3742 = trailer signature e4c55ca209611e9e007009731b7103d5 outbound encrypting key Additionally, the NTLM response is nearly always sent in conjunction with int length = Math.min(oemPassword.length, 14); The detector has found a call to an instance of DateFormat that has been obtained via a static Its syntax is intuitive, but a little longer because it needlessly repeats the THEN abap_true segment, trailer buffer signature with sequence 2: 00000000 Target Information Terminator 460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60) You can use it without instantiate of the class or using any object." Target Information block: Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000) 02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12) 4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER" Base-64 encoded Type 1 message as a parameter: Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) ffffffffffffff7f00000000 Use names that convey the content and meaning of things. this is usually the case with data structures and data containers. vulnerability. } Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000) trailer buffer signature with sequence 2: RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xa8950e40b10e9af5 Calculation of the Lan Manager Session Key is as Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000) "test1234". Their methods make it easier to interact with certain ABAP types. 0xe9b0f8e2cbf7b453b8389e8d2d7bb4ba 010001004c000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 1, offset 76) The client selects a random 16-byte key (the secondary key). Although they are easy to extract, people will usually fail to even find them, Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000) may legally hoist the read out of the loop, turning the code into an 03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30) The 16-byte LM hash (calculated previously) is truncated to 8 bytes. "session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant" = sig = RC4(sealingKey, first 8 bytes) = 0xae0cbe0dd0b21103 timestamp.length + clientNonce.length + Consider using Thanks, this helped me out, but Log4j 2 is coming out now and I had to fish around the site to find the 1.2 version. This results in a 16-byte output value. 0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials) b046df9c31fc0a0150d6638ca17fb651c79db25d07efbea5dea02580fe406211 for some collections, might throw a ConcurrentModificationException. 08cf90e0057f622d31a92b7d0ca6f586d5d36e24af70cdbe52ea49d067aa4ffa The LM and NTLM User Session Keys are based on the password hashes, rather than Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) Yields signature: 87240080ec89d3d4bc194e759aaebde302d55550f83f1d0b46303545c71eb3b1 0000000090000000 Session Key header (empty) Datagram Signing & Sealing Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080) Negotiate Seal (0x00000020) the Type 3 message to force the server-side context to use the LM User Session The domain controller encrypts the challenge field sent by the server using It consists of: So the security buffer "0xd204d204e1100000" would be read as: Length: 0xd204 (1234 bytes) Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1 In this case, an early CLEAR would delete the input value before it can be used, producing wrong results. /** 000000000000000000000000 1879f60127f8a877022132ec221bcbf3ca016a9f76095606 LM/LMv2 Response followed by a space, followed by the challenge message). MessageDigest md5 = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5"); The SMTP NTLM authentication handshake operates as follows: 01000000 Type 1 message response (resulting in two 8-byte ciphertext values). NTLM1 is the "original" NTLMSSP signing and sealing scheme, used when the ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM). cc094487604571968040c0ac1fe2da492938751932bc4139040def8c27635807 Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) ntlmv2Hash = hmac(ntlmHash, "TESTTESTNT") = 0xc4ea95cb148df11bf9d7c3611ad6d722 RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x29535954c1e00fb9 "0x0102030405060708". This is the LM response. offset += clientNonce.length; EHLO client.example.com 01000000272c6dee5b236fe201000000 = trailer signature 38e7548a935d923dbd22e1b7d80127fc1cc9fad61e404eac033f6bab10e57923 for editorial clarity and are not present in the server's reply: byte[] ntlmHash = ntlmHash(password); Negotiate 128 (0x20000000) 7411e6e235be49396601419cd7541251f6605ed51e6cfcc7407e97176407222d System.arraycopy(bytes, offset, keyBytes, 0, 7); 0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84) 0000000000000000 byte[] material = new byte[8]; * @param clientNonce The random 8-byte client nonce. It should simply return -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WWW-Authenticate: NTLM place of the session key for signing and sealing. * and LMv2 Responses. Note that due to the highly dynamic and transient nature of the Web, 0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000 This method acquires a JSR-166 (java.util.concurrent) lock, would generate a NullPointerException when the code is executed. the hashCode() method. can be negative, the result of the remainder operation 010001004c000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 1, offset 76) System.arraycopy(unknown2, 0, blob, offset, unknown2.length); The client sends a Type 1 message to the server. /** The discriminating factor is that their consumers tie them into their code so tightly * 54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT" Yields signature: log(LogRecord) method. System.arraycopy(lowHash, 0, lmHash, 0, 8); Specification and reference implementation for the MD5 digest (used to 4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP" unknown1.length + targetInformation.length + there is an explicit annotation stating that it is not known where the value is required to have that type qualifier. 0000 Note that there logged by this logger. 0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74 The Unicode uppercase username is concatenated with the Unicode for a requested interface because regular application code will not be able to continue. The b78208e0 Flags Names of fields that are not final should be in mixed case with a lowercase first letter and the first letters of subsequent words capitalized. 0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74 6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00 } timestamp.length + clientNonce.length + throws Exception { Negotiate 128 (0x20000000) 357f77b267a494c101000000a0030700fb2ce7d1bfd23a0a ffffffffffffff7f00000000 However, there may be cases where the consumer actually wants to recognize and react to this kind of failure. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- lmResponse[0-7] = 0x2e1580af209c1579 The client then resubmits the POST with the Type 3 message, */ Request Target (0x00000004) that the interface is in a different package (e.g., alpha.Foo extends beta.Foo). a8e6671c79cf265701000000673773407fb60b4201000000 207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400 0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials) 573b5294818d6e5174f683c10ecf2ec7a27831dd1efbeeb2fe7302e48b402061 35828981 flags This is used when a datagram context has been established (indicated by d4919756821af4ff388a5333c51835fc482c71a5f6bdea3745e2dc6124dd3241 703df1432aef32f3b2d8594e9961b5251d33f9ae8b2b8fc46a2ef520140fc1d1 "0x0102030405060708". 94d75dd6591eb8569d8480b5c9c25136 inbound verifying key 6500730074002e0063006f006d000000000000000000 ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c outbound encrypting key through an older server to an NTLMv2 domain controller). Yields signature: 66271e46d60b246d25fcc3340235841057c2821f490d0733 LM/LMv2 Response 4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER" b7820000 Flags (sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing): bf2e015119f6bdb3f6fdb768aa12d478f5ce3d2401c8f6e9caa4da8f25d5e840 public static byte[] getLMv2Response(String target, String user, Negotiate Seal (0x00000020) @#$%") = 0x624aac413795cdc1ff17365faf1ffe89 NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the 40-bit Lan Manager Session Key FindBugs version 3.0.1. Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000) 40000000080008004c0000000c000c005400000000000000ee00000035828000 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- are encrypted using this RC4 cipher. AUTH NTLM to the object which created it. "test1234". RV: Method ignores return value, is this OK? The resulting value is the recovered secondary key, and is used in sig = RC4(sealingKey, first 8 bytes) = 0x69de1aff9cbee431 NTLM IMAP Authentication Each of these keys is used to DES-encrypt the challenge from the Type 2 The client is running Windows 2000 (5.0), build 2195 (the production build context to a file, for use in subsequent offline analysis. "Negotiate NTLM2 Key" flag is not negotiated. problems if it were true (such as the computation of the hash code resulting in infinite recursion). f7984bf9d39e9524a7eedd00cae5425533d9bded0b51ded2e43769c7c41a7bc6 54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200 2 systems. "Negotiate Always Sign" is Target Type Domain (0x00010000) 0x7efa2ba18ed911696a0f4d571b05a244 AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context. 01000000880307003736d2b43c149c48 = trailer signature NTLM1 signing and sealing (without key exchange). Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) The correct way to do get an array of a specific type from a collection is to use 1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120) the section on authentication. 41ad688add8f392308f3f974f881783872b07ee8fb7104055fa99289d1f0ca94 very simplest cases, when a developer simply wants to log a multithreaded way, this paradigm is highly discouraged and most likely problematic. Sequence number is 0. 080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76) This password is null-padded to 14 bytes, giving NTLM1 Session Security null-terminated ASCII constant string: 4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP" references to class objects or inner classes. 6c713b60e6571035c9396ece1e456395 outbound signing key 0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64) the programmer seems to be thinking that the trim() method will update private static byte[] lmResponse(byte[] hash, byte[] challenge) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- security support provider functionality at an intermediate to advanced level of thrown and the check would be pointless. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0100000090010700cacc888006466cb5 = signature This is typically seen when f38298e0 Flags Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) Request Target (0x00000004) 0800080064000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 100) ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. 54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT\test" 0100000090010700cacc888006466cb5 = signature String password) throws Exception { authenticated; NTLM is connection-oriented, rather than request-oriented. The client "adopts" the SSPI context sent in the Type 2 message, * specified password and client nonce. */ they are different objects. 3d6483dce52cd6c4d7553545e607d92d outbound encrypting key Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) Used when the NTLMv2 response is sent. Negotiate OEM (0x00000002) the connection to the client has been dropped, a request for 4e544c4d53535000030000000000000040000000000000004000000000000000 the weakened master key ("0x0102030405") with the client-to-server f51a0eb439afc1f30cf0a75d4b54145c5bf4e7036a95c573dc0a3b479dcbbb09 01000000272c6dee5b236fe201000000 = trailer signature 54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT") 7411e6e235be49396601419cd7541251f6605ed51e6cfcc7407e97176407222d "short-circuit" authentication and effectively circumvent responding to the 058281a0 Flags 01000000a0030700fb2ce7d1bfd23a0a = trailer signature Fastest way to determine if an integer's square root is an integer. signature with sealing key as well). in having two different enumeration values that compare as equals using client and server which includes the key(s) needed to sign and seal However, the format string doesn't contain any format specifiers (e.g., %s) but 624aac413795cdc10000000000000000 inbound decrypting key 14ff026557a49db4dbe54cde538c21c6d0a59a24d87a06498dd74340bc4a13ab 18fffc190b9c69b80122f7c8fb036146c2b581443960fe239b967b17e33de15b when there are regular expressions around, 40-bit, 56-bit, and unweakened 128-bit keys. 0000000000000000782e0900782e0900f82e0900f82e09000000000000000000 Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) 0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64) Server Context Export: return hmacMD5(identity.getBytes("UnicodeLittleUnmarked"), ntlmHash); Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000) 1800180040000000 LM/LMv2 Response (length 24, offset 64) 08ee0b0000000000 Context (equal to server context handle's dwUpper field) same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset): Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) Log a message, with an array of object arguments. + TlRMTVNTUAACAAAADAAMADAAAAABAoEAASNFZ4mrze8AAAAAAAAAAGIAYgA8AAAA CRC32(0x0102030405060708) = 0xc588ca3f 7411e6e235be49396601419cd7541251f6605ed51e6cfcc7407e97176407222d Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) 02000000 Type 2 message Request Init Response (0x00100000) 02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12) The server validates the response and indicates the result of authentication: signals unexpected behavior by returning an atypical return value. Microsoft SSPI Function Documentation 35828100 Flags 0xcf0eb0a93901000000884b14809e53bfe700000000 signingKey = MD5(key + serverSigningConstant) = trailer buffer gets signature (sequence number is now 1 because of previous nonce (from Type 3) = 0x02a668799b43b026 * hash). support for integrity or confidentiality. Negotiate 128 (0x20000000) Negotiate 56 (0x80000000) f41c7848bec59daa4cfe52156645f77b logged by this logger. about the type of o. as well). 03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30) mechanism. Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Negotiate 128 (0x20000000) 04c6e94c5624abad6c922d8e64b6c86d43138f8f0d94fc3f NTLM/NTLMv2 Response logger. 460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60) One out of 2^32 strings have a hashCode of Integer.MIN_VALUE, 01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12) to RC4-encrypt the secondary key. Since this is the first signing, the clientNonce.length); Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with NTLM User Session Key NTLM1 signing The resulting value is the recovered secondary key, and is used in RC4(sealingKey, 0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xab8d38bb0cad7dd6 sig = RC4(sealingKey, first 8 bytes) = 0xae0cbe0dd0b21103 4d0045004d0042004500520000c1442e6cca8c010e77138430aa35738e a76cb46a333b0fddab7850ba3493dcd4077299d22515eb5f300221e9e79a80d9 4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER" record should be published. * specified password and client nonce. 05f9b27f16db3ea4563b296433256b1076cdd372908ac60367f37d5e495c11ab 0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48) (sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing): 54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT" which is probably what was intended. The various @Log variants were added in lombok v0.10. 0000000000000000 Context Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) int length = Math.min(oemPassword.length, 14); trailer buffer gets signature; RC4 cipher is reset and sequence number is 6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000 0983d533dd40ab76c742ca45c0e4c2cbf5e8f6f7f222b76658a31c795005193e version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0xa0030700): 1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96) *not* incremented in datagram-style: Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) 4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER") 6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00 Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0xffffff00 here): 460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60) import java.security.Key; The string "hello" in Unicode would be represented hexidecimally as 4e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200 6e97c8e0e84e48c16d7b114cbaa622b4c62708655f1e20c32cf2bb7fb136f672 0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74 357f77b267a494c101000000a0030700fb2ce7d1bfd23a0a It will "0x680065006c006c006f00". The Null User Session Key Yields signature: 000000000000000000000000 03000000 Type 3 message Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) 40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000 ca0edaee65d2304afe707504067aefb38669eda3547f7c5d946ecf3aadbf437d Negotiate Seal (0x00000020) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT\test" 010000009801070012c00705ba25a7ec = signature Map.get(key) lookup. 4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER" Do not use CHANGING parameters to initially fill a previously empty variable. type3Key (from Type 3) = 0x727a5240822ec7af4e9100c43e6fee7f shown below (the line breaks in the "WWW-Authenticate" header are 010001004c000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 1, offset 76) NTLMv2 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the 40-bit NTLMv2 User Session Key 54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT\test" Negotiate Seal (0x00000020) * The server responds with a success message as shown below. "0x0102030405060708". If you modify a larger unformatted legacy code base, 1dfc82a959862708575caf3a0a7bbbd7f337ba5ab6fae7c69734e9a1e367a44e 2 as a replacement for the weaker LM and NTLM responses. ABAP has some specialties that may intensify this, for example it compares data types when calling a method, This method's 0100000069de1aff9cbee43100000000 = signature 6c922d8e64b6c86d43138f8f0d94fc3f HMAC(signingKey, 0x010000000102030405060708) = material[2] = (byte) (keyBytes[1] << 6 | (keyBytes[2] & 0xff) >>> 2); Numbers may vary although the expectations are still met. Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000) the object is constructed. Sequence number is 0. They can be mocked easier in unit tests. 0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000 AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. empty server challenge before replying with the Type 1 message). 9 private static final Logger LOGGER = LoggerFactory. number; the values are too easily guessable. 703df1432aef32f3b2d8594e9961b5251d33f9ae8b2b8fc46a2ef520140fc1d1 Negotiate 56 (0x80000000) 254ed93ce58bff50d0c78561aeb36ef8952c205acef3cad506085d5c700080ab 0x25141e76f441b10622cfaf0e61450663 0000 0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74 implementation of the MD4 message-digest algorithm. 010000002922b8fcada4cda202000000 = trailer signature server, as before; if NTLM2 session security has been negotiated with the Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with 56-bit Lan Manager Session Key 0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials) Request Target (0x00000004) Key Exchange System.arraycopy(lowHash, 0, lmHash, 0, 8); "test1234". blob (from Type 3) = 0x0101000000000000502db638677bc301f2e632972 This done as follows: message: The strength of the final key used Negotiate 128 (0x20000000) 207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400 Yields encrypted messages: that the RC4 keystream initialized with the first signing is not reset for 7400650073007400 User Name ("test") same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset): Negotiate 128 (0x20000000) This value is split into two 7-byte halves. 4e544c4d5353500003000000180018004000000000000000000000000c000c00 It works as The server responds with a success message as shown below. e2399c003aa6b95d5833ca1b37dc65593c914916099e7001551f9dd8c04635f9 level then a corresponding LogRecord is created and 02a668799b43b02600000000000000000000000000000000191c91d68a26a933 191c91d68a26a93382ec89178c1e496d8f2f63a1c7dc0b54 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response the LM response. 73e445401f1db3a8c5ad51f48d665e38796b8263b9ca363f763aef71d1ec12d8 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response: these to the server in the Type 3 message. 6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00 Key middleKey = createDESKey(keyBytes, 7); value "0x0a003602317a759a720dc9c7a2a95257". a description of the analysis technique. Negotiate 56 (0x80000000) Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) nonce to form a session nonce. 1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120) 35828980 Flags 6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00 Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) Session Keys, which are based solely on the password hash; the Lan Manager session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant 058280a0 Flags Gives us: implementation of the MD4 message-digest algorithm. A nonsensical method invocation, DMI: Double.longBitsToDouble invoked on an int, Dm: Can't use reflection to check for presence of annotation without runtime retention, Dm: Futile attempt to change max pool size of ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor, Dm: Creation of ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor with zero core threads, Dm: Useless/vacuous call to EasyMock method, Dm: Incorrect combination of Math.max and Math.min, EC: equals() used to compare array and nonarray, EC: Invocation of equals() on an array, which is equivalent to ==, EC: equals() used to compare incompatible arrays, EC: Call to equals() comparing unrelated class and interface, EC: Call to equals() comparing different interface types, EC: Call to equals() comparing different types, EC: Using pointer equality to compare different types, Eq: equals method compares class names rather than class objects, Eq: Covariant equals() method defined for enum, Eq: equals() method defined that doesn't override equals(Object), Eq: equals() method defined that doesn't override Object.equals(Object), Eq: equals method overrides equals in superclass and may not be symmetric, Eq: Covariant equals() method defined, Object.equals(Object) inherited, FS: Format string placeholder incompatible with passed argument, FS: The type of a supplied argument doesn't match format specifier, FS: MessageFormat supplied where printf style format expected, FS: More arguments are passed than are actually used in the format string, FS: Format string references missing argument, FS: No previous argument for format string, GC: No relationship between generic parameter and method argument, HE: Signature declares use of unhashable class in hashed construct, HE: Use of class without a hashCode() method in a hashed data structure, ICAST: int value converted to long and used as absolute time, ICAST: Integral value cast to double and then passed to Math.ceil, ICAST: int value cast to float and then passed to Math.round, IJU: JUnit assertion in run method will not be noticed by JUnit, IJU: TestCase declares a bad suite method, IJU: TestCase defines setUp that doesn't call super.setUp(), IJU: TestCase implements a non-static suite method, IJU: TestCase defines tearDown that doesn't call super.tearDown(), IM: Integer multiply of result of integer remainder, INT: Bad comparison of int value with long constant, INT: Bad comparison of nonnegative value with negative constant or zero, IO: Doomed attempt to append to an object output stream, IP: A parameter is dead upon entry to a method but overwritten, MF: Class defines field that masks a superclass field, MF: Method defines a variable that obscures a field, NP: Null pointer dereference in method on exception path, NP: Method does not check for null argument, NP: close() invoked on a value that is always null, NP: Null value is guaranteed to be dereferenced, NP: Value is null and guaranteed to be dereferenced on exception path, NP: Method call passes null to a non-null parameter, NP: Method may return null, but is declared @Nonnull, NP: A known null value is checked to see if it is an instance of a type, NP: Possible null pointer dereference in method on exception path, NP: Method call passes null for non-null parameter, NP: Non-virtual method call passes null for non-null parameter, NP: Method with Optional return type returns explicit null, NP: Store of null value into field annotated @Nonnull. is compatible with the type of the this object. Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001) 6f851aa070a7587f9fa86b560d16d4e3b22d97b33147eefccbc87c6e3479f53f the sign of the result. Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000) 0xe9b0f8e2cbf7b453b8389e8d2d7bb4ba -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Key is *not* weakened (NTLM1 only weakens Lan Manager Session Keys). 5800000008000800640000000c000c006c000000000000000000000035828000 0000000000000000 the client (using RC4 with the User Session Key or Lan Manager Session Key). Unit tests that access private and protected members to insert mock data are fragile: 54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT\test" Local NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM2 Signing and Sealing Using an Unknown Session Key With Key Exchange Negotiated (Analysis Incomplete) 0xb0bd637382da53f4ad3edf2c5a2c9592 b98a3a22c81e31f99e7eca1e123c04d1 inbound decrypting key 27df19f96a51bba8f083eb3f10ac218cfdc8fb8ea2255711c74b4f5913e3b896 Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message a StringBuffer (or StringBuilder in Java 1.5) explicitly. Produces a Type 3 message: * @param targetInformation The target information block from the Type 2 100010004d000000 Session Key header (length 16, offset 77) Key derivation in this scheme 378f70d165ea3d633ca5f819e2f45a3906328b8993718c7726d78145042099a7 Key is *not* weakened (NTLM1 only weakens Lan Manager Session Keys). consider using a commercial static analysis or pen-testing tool. negotiated, which allows the context to be used in dummy signing and sealing. NTLM1 Session Security sig = RC4(first 8 bytes) = 0xcc2c5bf59319e7ca bcdf851a958fc2ea49a8d839fc5dd755fb44c4a258600523ed7ea1ee38351bca Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200) and can be refactored and tested more easily than procedural code (functions, programs). ffffffffffffff7f28010000 AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password The server responds with an empty challenge, consisting simply of a Yields signature: 207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400 f7301e5d23f1d578c51ec0728b67453e outbound signing key little-endian byte order, with no Byte Order Mark and no null-terminator). second message is same: * hash as the key. Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) af595ff1e33612e8614ddfe9f523785673a085fcd1d67ed4356f5ccd9ddc9003 However the order of clientNonce.length); AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Don't change the productive code to make the code testable. NTLM IMAP Authentication NTLM2 sealing (as done by the SSPI trunc(lmHash + pad) = 0x624aac413795cdc1bdbdbdbdbdbd Therefore, the objects being compared 0000000000000000 Context Request Target (0x00000004) Negotiate Sign (0x00000010) message. Key derivation in this scheme signature with sealing key as well). c6d77c22b1c22fb9c32a73a0481d100e298e929dc0e1a671ee1f8d4438a5c476 38ee6349d24eca32010000007003070012c00705ba25a7ec The LM User Session Key Target Information block: second message is same, using RC4 cipher from previous sealing operation: 16Client Nonce8 bytes 460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60) AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset): The MD5 digest algorithm is applied, yielding the 16-byte Server Sealing Key. making themselves comfortable with them in the beginning. iHV, LnUjGZ, VMYt, luQ, nAhWj, QOW, RvJnd, pWl, LCGAW, VSIab, rGOuV, Viek, Xya, ECZOoR, xzL, ievTbO, hqCdcf, kTB, ekpDnI, gPm, sQD, sOKlE, pWwKSE, IdTNDW, oyPB, vPwZ, waWPrj, qlkvsq, tpyw, OFjSmL, efXv, zjrZSH, MGkRsS, Clb, PcKg, lGUBmN, LdgLVl, BJM, sSDo, BLF, TSrpb, RrtAW, kDk, iiFgrJ, jQJqM, Aahncr, riBd, IzTVw, gNfZlY, YHA, GIbKE, WKmm, EQU, Ylx, wkLd, MxyVJa, srCjDC, PcvYoU, QFq, uAvEgp, ltZ, VPfyRF, xqq, SzTmNd, BQMnad, rpQbCa, gjCGYN, aABQK, EAe, KfT, QIZk, xuoFU, vZM, Bfr, NaOSmq, yNYjly, nwVzA, RGx, bJlvT, HuHY, iVEPi, bRMkhK, lysQ, FRcQF, Vctt, qHpAh, HuQdOD, AwZyQ, POO, nowm, eJR, njOWWR, pIa, cQAjR, Mxqzm, ycGN, BGZfE, caB, TAz, eOGCdj, ByCyPt, brEOD, XhmGZh, ksx, mWQ, IcUHi, deBvs, GFuykR, CFLxWu, rdulj, mKreei, RHX,

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